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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
UR.\XT

~COTT IIASI~.A~f,

Plaintiff and Apprllaut,

PI\lTL

YS.
l~I\lTLSEX, P.

ll. PAULSEN,
and B\rROX P ..\uLSEN, dba AC~IE
CH.A ~1~ H 11 ~XT ..\1~ C()~lP ..-\~\T, et al,
Defendants and llc.-..·pondents.

Case No.
9938

BRIEF OF
DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS,
d~ACMECRANERENTALCOMPANY

ST.A_1.,E~IEXT

OF THE

N.A.Tl~Rl~

OF THE CASE

Thi~

is an action for personal injuries which occurred during the construction of a new church building.
DISPOSI~TION

IN LO·VVER ICOl.. RT

. .\ftpr a verdict \\Tas returned in favor of the Plaintiff and . A.ppellant, the Lo\Yer Court granted DefendantsRespondent~, dba . A. c1ne Crane Rental Co1npany, a new
trial. Thereafter, in Case X o. 9935 the Plaintiff and
Appellant petitioned this court for an Interlocutory Appeal, Case X o. 9935, and on July 30, 1963, this court
denied the Plaintiff an Interlocutory Appeal.
In the Lo,ver Court the Defendants-Respondents,
1
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dba Ac1ne Crane Rental Co1npany, in addition to a
1fotion for a K e\\T ~rrial, filed a ~lotion for Re1nittitur of
Excessive Da1nages and a ~1otion to Btlt Aside the Jury
erdict and ,J udgn1ent thereon. The ne'v trial wa:-;
granted. The Lo"Ter Court did not and has not ruled on
the Defendants-Respondents' 1Iotion for a Re1nittitnr
of Excessive Da1nages and 1Iotion to Set Aside the Jury
\ . . erdict and Judgment thereon.

'T

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Defendants-Respondents, dba Acme Crane Rental Company, 'vant this court to affirm again the order
granting them a ne\\T trial unless this court conc1ndP:-;
the Lo,ver Court should be instructed to grant a judg.
1nent in favor of the Defendants-Respondents, dba . ~cHH!
.
Crane Rental Company, of No Cause of Action, N.O. ·v.
STATE:.\IENT OF

~IATERIAL

:B,ACTS

The Appellant's State1nent of Facts is inco1nplete
and merely sho,vs the facts and issues as the Appellant
contends them to be, and not as they "~ere necessarily
viewed to be by the trial court.
At about 1:00 P.l\I. on January 19, 1960, the Plaintiff 'vas injured during the course of the construction
of the :.\Iontunent Park Stake House near ,,. . asatch Boulevard and 13th South in Salt r~ake City, lTtah (R. 2412±2). The niontunent Park Stake House is located near
the intersection of .,,. . asatch Boulevard and 13th South
in Salt Lake 'City, Utah. At the time of the accident, the
Plaintiff had had seven years experience driving a
ready-mix sand and gravel truck (R. :2-±0). Exhibit 2-D,
2
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u diagratn, ~ho\vs generally the loeation of the po\verlines
in rPlation~hip to the concrete pour \vhich took place on
.J unuary 19, 1960. Exhibits 23-D and 26-D sho'v the
po\rPrlines at the job site as of .A.pril 4, 1963. In the
uppPr lPfthand eorner of Exhibit 2-D, Scott Hasla1n drew
a ero~8 \vith a circle (R. 242, 2-±3) to indicate \Yhere he
~topped his truck and \Vaited to unload it. He waited
nbout ten or fifteen 1ninutes to unload the truck (R. 243).
~eott llaslatn neYPr sa\v the po,verline or the poles (R.
:!47) prior to the accident. The weather was cold and
eloudy, but it \vas not stor1ny (R. 249). \Vhile \vaiting
to unload his truck, the Plaintiff didn't get out of the
truck. lie stated there was no need to get out and look
around (R. 2-!9). Prior to the accident he had made hundreds, if not thousands, of deliveries of ready-mix to job
~itP~

(R. :27 4).

\Vhen ~lr. Haslam arrived at the job site, he drove
in from 13th South in a southerly direction and turned
his truck around so it faced north (R. 275 ). He made no
exrunination of the pre1nises to see \vhether or not it
\Vas a safe place for him to unload (R. 276). He merely
assu1ned that everything \Vas safe (R. 277) without looking. He never looked to see where l\Ir. Walker, the truck
drivPr ahead of him, stopped his truck (R. 277). After
~[r. \\"" alker pulled out from unloading his truck ahead
of .Mr. Haslam, :air. Hasla1n backed his truck toward the
bucket but didn't back up as far as l\Ir. vValker had to
unload (R. 278) ..A.fter ~lr. Haslam found out that he
hadn't backed up to the bucket, he made no effort to get
in the truck and back it further to facilitate unloading
the truck (R. 278).
3
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The power pole that ~Ir. Haslan1 did not see, according to his own testin1ony (R. 279), \\~a~ son1e lG" in diameter and 25 to 26 feet out of the ground. l\lr. 1-laslain
never saw the po,ver pole or the powerline \\~hen h~
stepped out of the truck ( R. 279). He did not ~Pe the
four overhead po,verlines, but stated that if he had looked
up, it \\·as so1nething he could have seen (R. 280). In
fact, Mr. Haslam said that both the pole and the powerlines were something plain to be seen if he had looked
up (R. 280).
At the time he "'"as injured, Mr. Haslam \Vas standing with the bucket hanging from the boorn between hin1
and the crane (R. 280).
Mr. vValker, the eye 'vitness to the accident, who had
worked with l\Ir. Haslarn since about 1952 · ( R. 241) and
who had had the same experience as l\ir. Haslam, said
he kne'v about the danger of powerlines (R. ·243). He
testified that he (R. 243) spotted his truck in:·a safe place
and that he unloaded it ahead of Mr. Haslan1 (R. 243).
He unloaded five buckets of concrete safely (R. 243).
1\Ir. Walker also told us that the truck driver at a
job site can't unload his truck any faster than the job
foreman needs the concrete, and that the truck driver
takes an order from the job foreman (R. 244) as to when
to start unloading, and that you don't start unloading
the ready-mix truck until the concrete bucket is placed
(R. 2-!4), and that the truck driver unloads-the ready-mix
as slowly or as fast as they bring the bucket, unless told
otherwise (R. 245). After the accident 1\Ir. ''; alker unloaded Mr. Fiaslam's truck by backing it 6 or 8 feet fur~
4
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thPr soutlnvurd (R. 2-17). 'fhere \Yas no condition on the
.~round that kPpt ~lr. Hasla1n or ~lr. \Y alker from backing further to the south (R. 2-!8).
'rhP DPfPndant, Frank Cottrell, 'vas the job foreman

l'or thP church (R. :J5~). ~I r. Cottrell ordered the crane
t'rotn ..\ellH' Crane Rental Company (R. 365), but did not
tell the1n "·here he was going to set it. The crane was
hrought to thP job by Hyrum Petersen, the operator (R.
:366), and on arrival at the job site, ~Ir. Cottrell (R. 366)
8hO\\·rd ~lr. Petersen where the concrete pour was to be
dotH'. Jl r. Petersen and ~Ir. Cottrell discussed the setting
of the crane and then selected the spot where it 'vas
placed, as that spot was actually the only spot available
for placing the crane and using it to 1nove the concrete
fro1n the ready-mL""< trucks to the place of the pour (R.
366). ~lr. Cottrell also ordered the ready-mix concrete
fro1n lTtah Sand and Gravel (R. 367). On Exhibit D-2
Jlr. Cottrell has dra\Yn a circle and 'vritten in "Place of
Pour" to indicate the area of the foundation being poured
at the tin1e of the accident. nir. Cottrell said that he was
fruniliar with the customs and practices of unloading
ready-1ni..x concrete at job sites, and that the man re~ponsible for unloading the concrete out of the truck and
putting it into the gabro bucket was the driver of the
truck (R. 370). l\Ir. ·C·ottrell said that the powerline could
not be degenerized. He was using a 320 three phase power
tool in his shed, and that demanded four 'vires (R. 372).

Hyrum Petersen was sent to the job site by Acme
Crane Rental. :\Ir. Petersen found there 'vas only one
place he could place the crane (R. 387), and after a con5
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ference \Vith l\lr. Cottrell, he placed it in that spot for
the purpose of unloading the ready-mix trucks. At thP
time \\Talker's truck pulled out, the crane operator, lfyrurn Petersen, was moving the last gabro bucket of <-'Oncrete frorn Walker's truck to the place of the pour, and
did not see Scott Haslarn back his truck in for unloading
(R. 393). On diagran1 Exhibit 2-D, l\lr. Peter~l1 n placed
the crane at the tirne of the accident and drew an "'F" to
mark the front of the c.rane, and mentioned they \Vere
\Yorking over the rear of it because of n1ore stability (R.
399). He had the c.rane sitting so that the booru stuek out
at approxilnately a 70 to 75 foot degree (R. 400), and at
the time of the accident the crane \Vas equipped \vith a
60 foot stick or boom \vith a 30 foot jib attached on the
end (R. 400). l\Ir. Petersen took a crayon and dre\v a
circle sho\ving the radius of the S\ving of the gabro
bucket on the stick at the angle of the boom at the time
of the injury (R. 401). This radius is sho\vn on Exhibit
2-D. l\Ir. Petersen took his directions fron1 the rnan in
charge, Frank Cottrell, as to ,,~here the concrete pour \Yas
to be done ( R. 401). l\Ir. Petersen told us that it is impossible to tell the distance or judge the distance between
the cable of the crane and the high tension \vires from
his position in the cab of the crane (R. 40±). At the time
Mr. Haslam was injured, l\f r. Peterson \Vas lo\vering the
gabro bucket down\vard and swinging the boom slightly
to the north (R. ±07). J\Ir. Petersen said he sa\v the
bucket move to the north as it got to the ground level,
but did not see the party moving it (R. 408). He did not
see l\Ir. Haslan1 reach for the gabro bucket (R. ±08).
6
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l.>aul H. Paulsen testified that he i8 one of the partnPr~ in the Acn1e Crane Rental Con1pany and that he did
not heur about the accident until about a year before the
tiuu_. of trial (It 468). l\lr. Paulsen also tt•stified that the
t•ranP \Va8 rented to the church on an hourly basis, and
that he furnished the crane "rith the operator, Hyru1n
I )Ptersen, and John v"'" aldez, the oiler' at the rate of
$1~.00 pPr hour (R. 468). l\lr. Paulsen and none of the
other defendants doing business as the Ac1ne Crane Rental Con1pany \Vere present at the time Grant Scott Haslrun \Vas injured (R. 468). Mr. Paulsen said that when an
operator is sent out with a crane, he takes his orders
fron1 ". hoever is in charge of pouring the concrete on
the job (R. 470).
John , .. aldez, the oiler, at the time of the accident
was on tht• 'vall signalling the operator where to place
the bucket to du1np the pour from the gabro bucket (R.
-!7-!).
In regard to his injury, Mr. Haslam testified that
after the accident, Blaine Thomas took hi1n to Dr. Silas
~. S1nith (R. 250). After being exrunined by the doctor,
Mr. Haslrun said he was told to come back the next day.
~Ir. Haslan1 said that he had some burns on his hands,
but at the tin1e of the trial the burns were not visible,
and his hands had healed pretty Inuch (R. 251). The day
follo,ving the accident l\Ir. Haslam 'vent back to work
(R. ~53), and he continued to work thereafter (R. 253).
Dr. Silas Smith examined Mr. Haslam on the date of
the accident and said that he went over him fairly carefully and decided that there 'vas no systemic change as
7
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far as he could deter1nine fron1 what \\·as purported to
be an electric shock. He said the burn on his left hand
and his pulse, blood pressure, chest, and heart all seemed
to be quite normal. He had him X-rayed by Dr. 'Yint(•r
and stated that he noticed some abrasion and slight discoloration of his left shoulder. He described the injury
or the abrasion to the left shoulder as being rather supPrficial (R. 375). The injury did not require a bandage or
dressing by Dr. ~hnith (R. 375), and Dr. Smith concluded
that as far as any injury to the left shoulder, no medical
treatment \\~as necessary (R. 375). Dr. Smith told l\fr.
Haslam that he felt the injury to the shoulder was nothing,. and that he could attend his work and go ahead
\Yith it "·ithout any harm to himself (R. 375). Dr .Smith
s~id that from his examination, he thought Mr. Haslam
was capable of going back to "\\rork the next day (R. 375).
Dr. Silas Smith read the X-ray taken by Dr. '\7"inter and
could observe no bony change or injury (R. 375).
During the trial Mr. S1noot decided to stipulate that
he was making no claim for a shoulder injury as far as
separation of acromioclavicular joint (R. 376).
On cross examination 1\ir. Haslam said that the
burns on his hand left a slight discoloration of the skin
(R. 284), and that these are the only burns he had on
his. body (R. 284). 1\tir. Haslam also testified that the
burns did not require any bandages (R. 285).
W,i th regard to other injuries, these questions were
asked of !\Ir. Haslam: (R. 285, R. 286)
· Q.

''Did you ever InJure your body or your
8
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~boulder

or your hands in any other accident
like this ?"

;\.

I had son1e ribs that WPl'P cracked once
on a ~tPering "'heel of a truck."

Q.

"~\nd

~~xo.

that is the only other prior injury you
ever had?''

.:\. "()h, I have had 1ny back dislocated when \Ve
had our old chute, "'"hen we had to raise them
'vith our strength and not with the hydraulic
hoh;ts."

Q.
.-\.

Let 1ne ask you this : Did you ever InJure
your hands in any other accident~"

H

"No."

Q. "Did you ever injure your shoulder - your
left shoulder - in any other accident~"
..:\.

"No."

Q.

·~Ho\v

long \Vere you in Dr. Smith's place getting this treat1nent - this salve on your
hands?"

.\. •'Oh, I ilnagine I \Vas there t\venty or thirty
1uinutes."
The day follo,ving the aceident
back to \vork ( R. 286).

~Ir.

Haslam went

\Ya~

not until in January of 1961, a year following
the aecident, that ~Ir. Hasl~am visited Dr. Pemberton,
an o1thopedic specialist. Dr. Pemberton testified that
prior to January 5, 1961 Scott Haslam had not been a
patient of his, and that he did not see him until a year
after the accident (R. 304). He said th·at the only thing
he kne'v about the accident on January 19, 1960 was what
It

9
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

n!r. Haslam ·to~d him (R. 305), and originally \Vhen he
~a"~ him on January 5, 1961, he thought l\Ir. Ha~lan1 had
a minimal sep,ara.tion of the left aeromi'Oclavicular joint
(R. 305). He als·o thought that perhaps l\Ir. Haslam had
·a rotor-cuff tear. His finding in the exploratory operation ,,~as that his original dia.gnos~s ·of a rotor-cuff tPar
\Vas \vrong (R.. 306). He also testified that separation:s of
the type found in l\fr. Haslam's acromioclavicular joint
ordinarily \Yere not painful (R. 307), and he also stated
thrut as far as the acromioclavicul·ar was concerned, the
condition he found might have been an anatomical thing
and that there \Yas no separation at all (R. 307, 308). Dr.
Pemberton alS'o testified that after the operation ~fr.
H~aiS'lam had no limitation of movement in his arm, rotating it internally or extern;ally (R. 309). Likewise, he
found no lim·itation in adduction and none in circumduction or extension. On cross examination (R. 311) Dr.
Pen1berton \vas asked:
Q.

"In ans\\~ering Mr. Smoot's question as to
"\vhether or not the injury that you found,
\vhen you operated, could he related to the
accident of January 19, 1960, you were assuining thrut the history he gave you was
correct and he only had this one accident;
and you we-re rel1ating it to it because you
~"
. .
had no other "~ay to account f or t h e InJury.

A.

''That's true."

Q.

"Let me ask YOU: A~ssume \Ve can sho\v you
he had previ~us injury to this shoulder, and
had injuries before, wouldn't it be a reasonable assumption, maybe one of those had
10
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..:\.

eau~Pd

injury to his ~houlder "rhich you found

in the

bursa~"

..rrhis is a possibility, and I think we al,vays
have to depend on the history the patient
gives, in nl'aking a diagnosis and proceeding
with treatntent. Presumably, this m~an had
dated di~sability - not just pain, but disability - inability doing his work - from this
injury, as he stated to me; so I \vent on that
assmnption."

Dr. Pe1nberton also ~aid that if ~I r. Haslam had injured hi~ shoulder on September 1-±, 1957 and had had it
struck by a ~ x 4 on that date, that this injury could
have caused the condition of ~Ir. Haslam for which he
operated.

Dr. Pe1nberton also testified that bursitis or inflamJnation of the bursa is a condition ·that people get without
accident (R. 314) and that as you ge·t older, you have
1nore of a chance of getting it (R. 314). He likewise testified ·that if you operated on such a condition not eaused
by acc.ident, that the appearance of the bursa would be
the sruue as one caused by accident, and that the remedy
\Vould be th~ sa1ne. He also said that injury to the shoulder does not necessarily cause an inflamed bursa (R.
315). Dr. Pemberton said from his examination of the
bursa that there \r'as no indication as to when it hemorragt~d and becrune inflamed (R. 315). In fact, Dr. Pemberton said that the inflammation wasn't acut.e and that
it could h·ave been there for as 1nany as five years or
that it could have been there for three years. He said
rhat if Mr. Hru;lam had had other injuries to his shoulder
11
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\vhile \vorking on the job, that they could haYe caused
the condition \Y'hic'h he f'Ound (R. 316). He said that the
only ·thing he aCJtually repaired was the bursa which was
re1noved, and that he did not kno'v "\vhether the accident
raused it or not, and that there \\~as no \\~ay he could tell
\vhether it did or not (R. 315).
nlr. OrS'on I. Jacobson \vas called as a \\·itness, and
he testified that he \vas a Safety DireCJtor and Personnel
Director at l7tah Sand and Gravel Company and had
he en so since 1954 ( R. 432). 1\ir. Jacobson told us in 195 7
l\lr. Haslan1 reported injuries in July and Xove1nber.
~Ir. Jacobson testified that in November· of 1957 I\lr.
Haslam made a report of an injury to him to give to
the State Insurance Fund, and that at that tin1e he pulled
the muscles of his upper back and left shoulder (R. 434).
On Se·ptember 14, .1957 ~lr. Jacobson testified thrut 1\ir.
Hasla1n told him .while lifting a chute, a fello\v \\·orker
dropped his end, causing ·p,atient to S\\~ing around and
hit a 2 x 4 "\vith his left' shoulder, causing pain, and the
pain developed "\vhen he returned to "\vork on ~londay,
S·eptember 16, 1957 and 'vhile he was lifting the chute
again (R. 436). 1\Ir. Jacobson als:o testified (R. 434) that
l\fr. Haslan1 received an injury while lifting a mixer
chute in July of 19·57 and that he wrenched his back.
After ~the injury ·on September 14, 1957, Mr. Haslam
sought medical treatment from Dr. George ~-,. · Parker,
a chiropractor \Vho treated him after this alleged injury,
and he· was not called as a \vitness (R. 435).' · · ·
....

Mr. Jacobson also testified that

1n

November .of
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1~);>~, ~I

r. Hasla1n again was injured, and his injury was
n·porit:lo(l to the State Insuranee Fund, 'vhen he reached
into the cab of his truck fur a clutch lever and the door
of thP truck ble'v shut, knocking him into the door frame .
.\fter it \\~as brought to ~lr. llaslan1's attention that
he had had prior injuries to his left shoulder, he did not
take U1e stand a.nd deny the truth of Mr. Jacobson's
:.; ta tent en ts.
After returning to work lVIr. Haslam \vas able to
OJH•rah_l the h·vers that control the hydraulic system
for n1oving the ce1nent chute around (R. 445).
~Ir. Blaine Thorrul;s of Utah Sand and Gravel Company and the supe·rvisor, testified that he 'vas familiar
"·ith the general custom and practice of a truck driver
\\rhile 'va.iting to unload his truck, and that this man
:.;hould ~tand in the clear a.t all times (R. 447) and that
he should not touch the gabro bucket until it is on the
ground (R. -!-!8).
Dr. Paul l\iilligan was called as a witness by Acme
Crane Rental Company. He testified that he examined
~Ir. Haslarn's left shoulder and found a well healed scar
over the top of the shoulder and over the front of the
left shoulder itself. He put the shoulder through its
range of rnotion and found that the only limitation in
n1otion 'vas that he lacked 20 degrees of getting it up as
high as he could get the other arm, although he could
push the hand the rest of the 'vay. He found no limitation of his ability to rotate the shoulder internally or
externally and no evidence of shrinkage of any muscles
(R. 463). Dr. Milligan testified as to the cause of loss of
13
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adduction or raising· of the left ar1n, that thi~ i~ due to
adhesions in the left shoulder and that he did not know
the cause of the adhesrons. Dr. ~Iilligan \vas asked if he
had an opinion as to \vhich accident caused the infla1ned
bursa, if any, \vhether it \Vas the accident on January 19,
1960 or the one on September 14, 1957 or the one on
~epte1nber 16, 1957, or the one on November 18, 1958,
and he reported that he had no opinion as to "~hich of
these injuries u1ight have caused the inflamed bursa (R.
465). Dr. ~lilligan like,vise told the court that he could
not diagnose the time as to \Vhen an infla1ned bursa
arose (R. 467). He did, ho\vever, say that n1os.t inflan1ed
bursae are caused by degenerative changes that occur
to the shoulder \vithout injury (R. 4-G7).
11r. Ha.sla1n's stay in the hospital only r,equired five
days for the operation performed by Dr. Pe1nberton (R.
255A).
Follo\ving the operation in February of 1961, l\[r.
Hasla1n testified that he \vas off \vork fron1 February
7th until the 1:-;t of :J[ay. ~lr. Haslam used part of the
tin1e he \va~ off \\~ork starting in April to build a 600
foot addition onto the rear of his house, and he stated
to Dr. ~1:illigan that he "~orked at digging the footings
and putting in the for1ns himself (R. 461). He also stated
that in ~fay and thereafter, he "·orked on \veekends to
finish up the addition to his house. On recross-examination l\fr. Haslan1 admitted that the prior injuries, at least
one or t\YO of the1n, required treatlnent by Dr. Parker
(R. 479).
Prior to sub1nitting the case to the jury, the De-
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fPndant~,

Pauh;en, dba Acme Crane Rental Company,
rnoved the court, as a n1atter of law, to strike fro1n the
rE.lcord nll testimony relating to loss of earnings on the
part of the Plaintiff, past or future, all exhibits on
~pP<·ial datnages, testimony relating to Dr. Pen1berton's
treabnent and operation charge, including hospital bill,
und all rlai1ns that the Plaintiff had for pennanent disability or pain arising from Dr. Pemberton's operation
and the treahnent of the Plaintiff (R. 491). In addition,
th(\ Defendants, dba Acme Crane Rental Company, reque~tP<l Instn1ction No. 38A be given to the jury (R.
103) \\·hich is as follo,vs:
Instruction No. 88A
·~You

arP instructed that as a matter of law
the plaintiff has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the following items of which
he claiins damage~s, and you must not award, if
you should find in favor of the plaintiff, any
damages for:

1. .A.ny loss of earnings, past and future.
:2. Any special damages for medical and hospital expenses incident to Dr. Pemberton's
treatment and operation upon the plaintiff.

3. Any dam·ages for permanent disability or
pain arising from Dr. Pe1nberton's operation and treatment of the plaintiff.
Further, you are instructed that in this law
suit, the plaintiff has proved no special damages,
and you Inust not a\vard him any special damages
for any expenses of doctors, medicines, X-rays
and hospital services."

15
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

A complicated set of special interrogatorie·s \ras subInitted to the jury (R. 142-145). The jurors were instructed that if they returned a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff for damages, that ~th·ey were required to return
a verdict in like amount in favor of the Paulsens again~t
the Third Party Defendant, Hyrum Petersen (R. 1-t;)).
The first time the jury returned, they returned $50,000.00
general damages in favor of the Plaintiff, and $558.80
special damages, but on the mandatory instruction in
favor of the defendants, Paulsen, they allo,ved $100.00
general da1nages and $58.00 special da1nages, or a total
of $158.00 (R. 1-!5 ). The jurors corrected their verdict
in favor of the Third Party Plaintiffs only after being
admonished by the eourt to do so and sent out a second
time (R.145).
The Defendants, Paulsen, dba Ac1ne Crane Rental
Company, moved for a new trial upon the follo,ring
grounds:
1. Excessive da1nages appearing to have been
given unde·r the influence of passion or prejudice,
2. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the ver-

dict and that it is against la,v, and

3. Error in la'v (R. 159).
The Defendants, Paulsen, dba Acn1e Crane Rental
Company, claimed that the plaintiff and Hyrum Petersen \vere under the supervision and conrtrol of the defendant church, and the. \York each \vas doing \vas a part
of a trade or business o.f the employer church in building
the stake house, and that as such, \vork1nen's compensa16
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tion \vould he and was plaintiff's sole remedy, and that
no recovery could be had against Ac1ne Crane Rental
t\nnpa.ny in this suit (R. 37).
II o\vever, in instructing the jury the court disre.~arded tht Defendant, Acn1e Crane Rental Con1pany's
dPfense in this re:-;pect, the court gave Instruction No. 12
(H. l~t~) " ..hirh is as follows:
Instruction No. 12
•'It has been established that the defendant,
Hyru1n Peterson, was acting as agent for the
P·aulson defendants and within the scope of his
(lmployment at the time of the events out of which
the accident involved in thi's case occurred.
If, therefore, you find that said Hyrum Peter~on "Tas negligent, and that his conduct was the
proxi1na.te, or a proximate, cause of plaintiff's
injury, you are instructed that, as a matter of
la,v, -you may find that the Paulson defendants
were negligent, and that their neglig·ence so found
was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury."
The Defendants, Paulsen, also requested the court
to r~turn a directed verdict in their favor and against
the plaintiff (R. 62).
On the question of willful msiconduct, the court gave
ln~truction X o. 7 (R·. 127) \vhich is as follows:
Instruction No. 7
"Plain tiff in this case bases his claim against
defendants upon t"To kinds of misconduct: First,
an act or acts of ordinary. . negligence, of which a
definition has elsewhere in these instructions been
given to you. Second, an act or acts that were
"Tanton or reckless.
To make an act wanton or reckless, the party
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doing the act or failing to aet n1u~t be con~eiou~
of his conduct, and though having no intent to
injure, 111ust be conscious, from his knowledge of
the surrounding circums·tances and existing conditions, th·at his conduct will narturally and probably result in injury to another. In order that the
actor's conduct rnay be reckles~, it is not nece~
sary that he hirnself recognize it a~ being extrernely dangerous. It is enough that he kno\\ S or has
reason to kno"'" of circumstances \vhich would
bring hirn to the realization as an ordinary, reasonable man, of the highly dangerous character
of his actions.
Reckless or wanton misconduct differs from
intentional \vrong doing in a very irnportant particular. While an act to be reckless must be intended by the actor, the actor does not intend to
cause the harm which results frorn it. It i::; enough
that he realizes, or, from facts \\"hich he kno\vs,
should realize tha:t there is a strong probability
that harm may result, even though he hopes or
even expects that his conduct \Yill ]H'oye harrnless."
In the special interrogatories in ans\Yering the question as to willful misconduct, it is to be noted that the
jury found Petersen guilty of wanton or reckless Inisconduct (R. 142), and Cottrell guilty of \\~anton or reckless
misconduct (R. 7). The court granted the Defendants',
Paulsen, motion to dismiss any claim against them because of their alleg·ed \villful or wanton n1isconduct (R.
484).
Instruction No. 12 (R. 132) permitted the Defendants, Acrne Crane Rental Cornpany, to be held liable for
the negligent acts of Hyrun1 Petersen· only and did not
instruct that th·ey \vould be responsible for \Yillful or
\vanton misconduct.
18
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ARGU~fENT

POINT I.
THE COURT DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION
TO HEAR APPEAL.

Article 8, Section 9 of the Constitution of the State
of lTtah provides as follows:
Sec. 9..A.ppeals from district court- From justices'
I

'

'

"F ro1n all final judgments of the district
CO'ltrts, there shall be a right of appeal to the
Supreuze Court. The appeal shall be upon the rec-

ord n1ade in the court below and under such regulations as m·ay be provided by law. In equity cases
the appeal mny be on questions of both law and
fact; in cases at la'\v the appeal shall be on que~s
tions of la\v alone. Appeals shall also lie from the
final orders and decrees of the Court in the administration of decedent estates, and in cases of
guardianship, as shall be provided by law. Appeals shall also lie from the final judgment of
justices of the peace in civil and criminal cases
to the District Courts on both questions of law
and fact, with such limitations and restrictions
as shall· be provided by law; and the decision of
the District Courts on such appeals shall be final,
except in cases involving the validity or constitutionality of a statute."
Ru1e 72, l~tah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
(a) From Final Judgments. "An appeal may be

taken to the Supre1ne Court from all fimd judgnzents, ·in accordance 'U)ith these rules; provided,
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that in actions originating in city courts and in
justices' courts, the decision of the di~ trict rourt
on ap·peal shall be final, except: ( 1) In casef' involving the validity or constitutionality of a statute or ordinance; and (2) In actions originating
in citv courts in \Yhich the a1nount in controversy.
exceeds $100.00, exclusive of costs."
~

Rule 72(b) l~tah Rules of Civil Procedure, also provides for interlocutory appeal~. Ho\\~ever, the PlaintiffAppellant's Petition for an Interlocutory Appeal fron1
the Order Granting a K ew Trial "\Yas denied by thi~ rourt
on July 30, 1963, Case No. 9935.
The record does not indicate, in Case Ko. 9935, or
in this case that Plaintiff-.A.ppellant has filed a Petition
for a Rehearing from the Order Denying an Interlocutory Appeal.
In Na.tional Farmers Union Property and Casualty
Company vs. Thompson (1955) 4 Utah 2d 7, 286 P. 2d
2-!9, this court said an order granting a ne"~ trial is different in character than an order denying one, and the
latter terminates the cause, "\Yhile the fonner operates to
vacate the judgn1ent and reinstate the case as one undisposed of before the court, and over \Yhich the court
re,tains jurisdiction.
It is submitted that the trial court having retained
jurisdiction of the case by granting the Inotion for a new
trial, tha,t this eourt does not have jurisdiction in view
of its order denying an interlocutory appeal in Case No.
9935.
20
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POINT II.
THE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVE BY A
PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE THAT
THE OPERATION AND TREATMENT OF DR. PEMBERTON AROSE FROl\1 THE INJURIES HE RECEIVED IN THE ACCIDENT ON JANUARY 19, 1960.

l)r. Paul Pe1nberton, the plaintiff's orthopedic speciali~t, tP~tified that the only thing he knew about the
a('eident on Jan nary 19, 1960 was what the plaintiff told
hin1 about it (R. 305). On cross exa1nination Dr. P·emberton (It 311) stated that in answering 1\Ir. Smoot's question a:--; to \vhethPr or not the injury that he found when
he operated could be related to the accident of January
U). 1960, he said he was assun~in,q the history he was
giren was correct, and that Mr. Haslam only had this
one accident, and there was no other way to account for
the injury. Further, Dr. Pemberton said that assuming
~lr. Haslan1 had injured his shoulder and back on September 1-!, 1957, that c-ould also cause the condition for
which he operated (R. 311-313). Dr. Pemberton said that
if ~lr. Haslam had had a previous injury to this shoulder,
it \vould be a reasonable assun1ption that maybe one of
these had caused injury to the shoulder 'vhich he found
in the bursa (R. 311). Like,vise, Dr. Pemberton said from
the exatnination of the bursa, you could not tell when it
beca1ne infla1ned, and that the condition could have been
there for as many as five years (R. 315). Likewise, Dr.
PPmberton said that if Mr. Haslam· had had an injury
to his shoulder on at least three occasions in the period
of t'vo prior years before this accident, all of which
occurred on the job, that these could very well have
21
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caused the condition w··hich he found (R. 316). Further,
in answering to 1\Ir. Snow's question (R. 318), Dr. Penlberton said that he didn't know whether the accident on
January 19, 1960 caused the condition for \vhich he operated in F·ebruary, 1961, and that there was no way you
could tell what caused the condition for which he operated. Dr. Pemberton even said the inflamed bursa could
occur without accident (R. 314).
On redire·ct-examination !1r. Smoot asked Dr. Pemberton this question:

Q. "Now, Doctor, the counsel had made quite a
point of the fact that certain things 'could
haye' taken place with reference to the bursa.
Assuming a person who has been able to work
on a ready-mix truck, as is described to you
in Scott Haslam's history, and that he had no
difficulty in operating that truck, and doing
the work that he was accustomed to doing,
and about which he related to you, assuming
all that situation, you have an opinion as to
what really caused this inflamed bursa~"
And the answer he got was :
A.

"I believe it was, assuming that this history
that I got from him was true, it was my judgment, and still is, that the inflamed bursa was
due to the injury he suffered in January, the
year before I sa'v him - 1960."

Mr. Jacobson, the Safety and Personnel Director for
Utah Sand and Gravel Company, testified following Dr.
Pemberton that in November of 1957 he twice reported
injuries, and that while turning around in a small area,
he pulled the back muscles of the upper back and left
22
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~houlder

(R. 434). Also, 1\Ir. Jacobson testified that in
July of 1957 he received an injury while lifting a mixer
chute and wrenched his back. In September of 1957 Mr .
.Jacobson said ~Ir. Haslam reported that while lifting a
rhute, a fellow 'vorker dropped his end, causing him to
s\ving around and strike a 2 x 4 board with his left
~boulder causing pain, and that he saw Dr. Parker as
a result of this injury (R. 436). l\{r. Haslam also reported an injury to l\lr. Jacobson in November of 1958~
saying that while pouring curb and gutter, he reached
into the cab and that the door of the truck blew shut,
knocking him into the door frame and injuring his back
(R. 440).
None of these injuries were reported to Dr. Paul
Pemberton prior to his testifying for the plaintiff on
direct examination.
Dr. Pemberton was not recalled as a witness.
Dr. Paul ~Iilligan, the defendants' witness, testified
that you could not diagnose the time as to when an inflamed bursa arose (R. 467), and said he had no opinion
as to which of the four previous injuries may have caused
the inflamed bursa (R. 467).

On further cross examination, Mr. H·aslam admitted
that he had h·ad the other prior injuries (R. 478).
He made further admissions as to the prior injuries
on rebuttal examination by his own counsel (R. 477, 478).
~Ir. Hasla1n admitted the history he gave Dr. Pemberton of only an accident and injury on J·anuary 19,
1960 was not true, and Dr. Pemberton qualified his opin23
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ion, saying that assuming the history w~s true, that he
would relate the inflamed bursa to the accident on January 19, 1960 (R. 318).
The plaintiff's minor disability is a result of adhesions following the operation by Dr. Pemberton. The
trial court refused to strike from the record all testin1ony
relating to loss of earnings on the part of the plaintiff,
past or future, and all exhibits on special damages, testimony relating to Dr. Pen1berton's treatment, and testimony relating to his pennanent disability (R. 491), ana
refused to give requested Instruction No. 38-A (R. 103).
The jury filled in the void and sup~plied the proof for
the plaintiff.
In IJJ.oore vs. the Denver and Rio Grande Western
Railroad Company (1956) 4 Utah 2d 255, 292 P. 2d -!89,
\vhere a suit was brought for injuries to the plaintiff's
back and nervous system, including a ruptured intervertebral disc in the lo\ver lumbar region of the spine,
and where the testimony of Dr. Clegg \Vas based upon
examination plus history of pain as given by the plaintiff, and that there was a nerve irritation, and that it
''?as possible the accident initiated the condition, and the
nerve irritation \Vas possibly due to pressure on nerve
beeause of irritation from a disc, and 'vhere the testimony was merely sufficient to establish that a disc injury
was not impossible, this court held the District Court
should have given the defendant's requested instruction
taking consideration of a ruptured intervertebral dise to
the jury on the ground there was no competent evidence
on the 1natter, and rev~rsed a v~rdict for the plaintiff and
24
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.~ranh'd

the defPndant a new trial. In the principal case
Judge Faux decided to keep jurisdiction and grant a
new trial.
In Chief Consolidated lll iniug Co1npany vs. Salisbury (19~~) 61 Utah 66, 210 P. 929, 'vhere the plaintiff's
t{'~titnony \ras to the effect the accident might have, or
eould have, accelerated heart disease, and there being no
other evidence than this, the court held that an a'vard
upon such speculative evidence must be annulled.
In this case there are a number of probabilities or
po~~ibilities as to when l\Ir. Haslam obtained his inflatned bursa. He may have got the inflamed bursa in
.July of 1957: September, 1957; November, 1957; or NoYl'tnber, 1958, or even in the accident in question on
Jan nary 19, 1960. X one of the doctors could say. A choice
of probabilities does not meet the requirement of a pre-·
ponderance of the evidence.
In AIL:arado vs. Tucker (1954) 2 Utah 2d 16, 268 P.
~d 896, \\'"here the plaintiff's 'vitness, a police officer,
testified on direct exan1ination the speed of the plaintiff's car "·as 35 1n.p.h., but on cross examination, modified his testimony and said the speed was somewhere
bet,veen 25 to 30 m.p.h., our court said the burden of
proving the charge of speeding was upon the plaintiff,
and that this burden was not satisfied with speculation
or conjecture, but only on a preponderance of the evidence, and that a choice of probabilities does not meet
this requirement.
Actually, in this case the plaintiff does not even
come up "rith a choice of probabilities as Dr. Pemberton
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said his opinion relating the need for the operation to
the accident on January 19, 1960 was only true if the
history he was given was true, and this was clearly shown
not to be the case.
When the conflict in testimony comes from the plaintiff's own witnes~ses or the plaintiff's own testimony, the
plaintiff is not entitled to the most favorable probability,
Fowler vs. Pleasant Valley Coal Cornpany (1898) 16
Utah 348, 52 P. 594. In ~4.lvarado vs. Tucker, supra., this
court said the testimony of a witness on direct examination is no stronger than modified on cross examination,
and that a single part of an officer's testimony cannot
be singled out to the exclusion of other parts of his
testimony.
As Dr. Pemberton said his opinion relating the operation and treatment to the accident on January 19, 1960
was only true if there were no other injuries, there is
no competent medical evidence to support the verdict,
and the trial court properly granted a new trial.
POINT III.
EXCESSIVE DAMAGES WERE GIVEN UNDER
THE INFLUENCE OF PASSION AND PREJUDICE.

The best exhibit as to the passion and prejudice of
the jury is shown by the ans\vers they gave to questions
10 and 11 in the special interrogatories (R. 145). Although the jury was instructed to award the Third Party
Plaintiffs, the Pa.ulsens, verdicts in the same amount as
they awarded the Plaintiff in the foregoing interrogatory, they, nevertheless, refused to follow the court's
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1nnndatory instruction and \vhile they gave the Plaintiff
$~l0,000.00 general da.Inages, they gave the Paulsens only
$100.00 gPneral datnages, and where they gave the Plaintiff $~>;>~L~O special datnagPs, they gave the Paulsens only
$~l~.00 and had to be adtnonished and directed by the
eonrt to go back and correct their verdict. :\Ir. Haslam
\\'as able to go back to \vork the day follo,ving the accident, and \rorked straig·ht through. His loss of earnings
und medical specials did not arise until an operation a
yPar follo\\·ing the accident and then his own doctor, Dr.
PPtnberton, stated he could only relate the treatment
and operation he performed to the accident if he could
a~snnlP the histor~~ was true, and this was found not to
be true.
The loss of earnings was not substantial, and it was
sho\\·n that l\1r. Haslam lost at least a part of his time
fro1n work because of an addition of 600 sq. ft., which he
\ras building on his house ( R. 461). We all know it is a
little hard to build a 600 sq. ft. addition at home and do
thP footings and concrete work and have additional time
to w·ork overtilne extra hours to increase our earnings.
~lr. Haslan1's only disability wa.s a 10 to 15 per cent
liinitation and adduction of his left ar1n, or inability to
raise it straight over his left shoulder. There is no showing that this type of disability "~ould limit his earnings
or his ability to hold a job, and in fact, prior to the trial,
he got a better job "~orking for the Teamster's Union.
In Stan1p rs. the [inion Pacific Railroad Co. (1954) 5
l~tah ~d 397, 303 P. 2d 279, \vhere the a\vard made by the
jury had no basis and fact and \Yas so excessive as to be
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shocking to one's conscience and too clearly indicated
passion or prejudice, and it abundantly appeared that
there was no evidence to support or justify the verdict,
this court held the trial court abused its discretion in
refusing to grant a ne\v trial. In Starnp vs. U n·ion Pacific
Railroad Co,mpany, supra., where the plaintiff claimed he
continued to suffer recurrent pain as particles of a torp·edo worked out of his eyeball \vhere they had lodged
after an exp·losion, and where he continued to work except for 12 days immediately following the accident, and
where the case \Vas tried about a year after the accident,
and where at the time of trial the plaintiff co1nplained
of he~adaches and that he feared loss of his eyesight, and
that he \vorried, although he had not inquired of his
doctors as to any justification for his worry, and \Yhere
the plaintiff's doctor, an eye specialist, testified that he
had examined the plaintiff and that in his opinion the
plaintiff was not in any danger, and that he had advised
the plaintiff at the time of the first examination 13 days
after the accident, and that there \vas no damage to
plaintiff's ability to see, and where a verdict was returned in the su1n of $12,500.00 less $2,500.00 deducted
under the F .E.L.A. rule, this court held the verdict \vas
without all reasonable bounds for the detailed injury
and that it had a duty of a\Yarding a ne\v trial or a remittitur. Since Jensen vs. Den1.:er and R£o Grande Western Railroad (1914) 44 Utah 100, 138 P. 1185, 1192, the
rule in Utah has been that the jury cannot go unbridled
and unchecked in awarding damages.
In considering the damages to award the plaintiff,
the jury should have been limited to the damages and
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injuriPs he ~u~t.ainPd on the date of the accident and the
treahnPnt rPndered hy Dr. Silas Stnith.
POINT IV.
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO
JUSTIFY THE VERDICT, AND THE VERDICT WAS
AGAINST THE LAW.

fn support of this point, we will submit no argument
in addition to that raised under Points II and III.
P.OINT V.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION WAS
PLAINTIFF'S EXCLUSIVE REMEDY.

THE

lTtah has an extremely broad Workmen's Compensation act. Section 35-1-42, lTtah Code Annotated 1953, is
as follows:
35-1--t2. Etnployers enumerated and defined Regularly employed - Independent contractors
- HThe follo"ring shall constitute employers subject to the provisions of this title :
(1} The state, and each county, city, town and
school district therein.
(:2) Every person, finn and private corp·oration, including every public utility, having in
service one or more workmen or operatives regularly en1ployed in the same business, or in or
about the same establishment, under any contract
of hire, express or implied, oral or 'vritten, except
agricultural laborers and domestic servants; provided, that employers of agricultural laborers and
domestic servants, shall have the right to come
under the terms of this title by complying with
the provisions thereof and the rules and regulations of the commission.
'·The term 'regularly' as herein used shall include all employments in the usual course of the
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trade, business, profession or occupation of the
employer, whether continuous throughout thll
year or for only a portion of the year.
"Where any entployer procures any work to
be done wholly or in pa.rt for him uy a contractor
over whose work he retain,s superrision or control, and such work is a paTt or process in the
trade or b1tsiness of the c1nployer, such contractor, and all persons employed by him, and all subcontractors under him, .and all persons employed
by any such subcont-ractors, shall be deemed, within the meaning of this section, employees of sucn,
original employer. Any person, firm or corporation engaged in the p~erformance of work as an
independent contractor shall be deemed an employer within the Ineaning of this section. The
tenn 'independent contractor/ as herein used, is
defined to be any p~erson, association or corporation engaged in the performance of any work
for ~another, who, while so engaged, is independent
of the employer in all that p·ertains to the execution of the work, is not subject to the rule or
control of the employer, is engaged only in the
performance orf a definite job or piece of work,
and is subordinate to the employer only in effecting a result in accordance with the employer's
design."

From the above definition, it's obvious that you do
not have to he on the payroll of any cert1ain person to
be an emp~loyee 'vithin the definition of the \\Torkmen's
Comp·ensation Act. If the church retained supervision
or control in any respect over the 'vork being done by
Scott Has~lam and Hyrum Petersen in the building of
the stake house, both Hyrum Petel~sen and Scott Haslam
were employees within the meaning of the Workmen':-;
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Cotnpensation A<·t. l~:vPryonc agrePs that Frank Cottrell,
the forPnlan for the church, ordered the concrete, ordered
Uu.\ cranP, controlled the rate of pour, and arranged the
job sitP to pour the concrete. Mr. fiaslam ·coul·d not go
np and dlunp the concrete until the church was ready to
rPe(live it. and ~I r. Hyru1n Petersen cauld not take the
concrete and dtnnp it until the church was ready for the
pour. Without any doubt, both of these men were under
thP ~npervision and control of the church.
35-1-60, l'"tah Code Annotated 1953, reads as follo"Ts:
:~;>-1-60.

Exclusive re1nedy against employer, or
officer, agent or employee - O·ccupational disease
execpted. - "The r"ight to recover compensation
pu rsua·nt to thr provisions of this title for injuries
su.stained by an etnployee, whether result,ing in
death or uot, shall be the e.rcZ.usive remedy against
the en1ployer and shall be the exclusive rem~edy
aqai nst any officer, agent or e1nployee of the employer and the liabilities of the employer ·imposed
by this act shall be in place of .any and all other
civilliabili.ty u·hatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to such etnployre or to his spouse, " . idow;
children, parents, dependents, next of kin, heirs,
personal representatives, guardian, or any other
person 'V'homsoever, on aecount of any accident
or injury· or death, in .any way contracted, sustained, aggravated or incurred by such employee
in the course of or because of or ari·sing out of
his employment, and no action at law may be
maintained against an employer or against any
officer, agent or employee of the employer based
upon any accident, injury or death of an employee. X othing in this se·ction, ho,vever, shall p~re
vent an employee (or his dependents) from filing
a claim with the industrial commission orf Utah
31
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for c.ompensation in those eases \vithin the provisions of the litah Occupational Disease Disability Act, as amended."
In lJlurray vs. Wasatch Grading Conzpany (1929) 73
Utah 430, 27 4 P. 940, \\"here the plaintiff \vas not on the
immediate payroll of the employer, he \Vas held, nevertheless, to be an e1nployee, and that Workmen's Con1p~ensation was the exclusive remedy. In Murray t·s.
Wasatch Grading Company, supra, ,,,. asatch Grading
Company ha:d a contract to widen the highway in Spanish
Fork ~c~anyon adjacent to the railroad tracks of the Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Comp~any. Rock
was blasted from the mountainside and rolled onto the
tracks. The plain~tiff l\l urray, "\Vas on the payroll of the
railroad company and was taken to the job site by the
railroad roadma.ster. The grading company was required
to reimburse the railroad cornpany for the \\"ages of the
plaintiff, and the plaintiff's duties required that he receive messages as to when trains would arrive and that
by telephone he \vould communicate with the railro'ad
dispatcher. ''1hen not con1municating, he was required
to flag trains and assist in re1noving rocks from the
tracks with other employees of "W"'a.satch Grading Company. Wasatch Grading Company carried 'Vorlo.nen'~
Comp~ensation insurance \\"ith the State Insurance Fund
and did not list the p·laintiff as an employee. The plaintiff was injured 'vhile re·moving rocks from the tracks,
and the trial court refused to direct a verdict in favor of
Wasatch Grading c:ompany, and on ap~peal this court
said where any employer procures any work to be done
wholly or in part for him by a contractor over whose
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work he retains ~ upervision or control and the \rork so
pr<wured to hP done is a part or process in the trade of
the en1ployer, then ~ueh ~ubcontractor and all persons
.-tnployPd hy hiu1 are employees, and 'vhere the jury
returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, the trial court
t'rrttd in rPfn~ing to direct a verdict for the defendant.
'rhe conunon law right of ·an employee to ~bring a
suit \Vas lost 'vith the adoption of the 1917 compensation
net. Now the employee does not have to prove fault or
negligence on the part of his employer, and no longer
(~UJl hP be ~ned by a fellow employee for his own negli~
gence. In order \\~ords, our Uta·h Con1pensation act offers
the etnployee double protection. It is. not unique, and it
i~ like the con1pensation act of a number of other states.

'r

ln Oregon
orktnen's Cotnp·ensation is the exclusivP re1nedy. In Pruett t·s. Lininger (1960) 224 Ore. 61±,
356 P. 2d 54 7, "rhere an e1nployee of a general bridge·
contractor brought a subrogation action against the owners of a crane being rented by his employer to use in
pouring concrete, and where the evidence sho,ved that
the operator of the crane 'vas etnployed on an hourly
ba~i~ and operated the crane under the direction of ·the
bridge contractor, and where the employee that was in:..
jured \\~as guiding a· concrete buCket when a cable from
"rhich the bucket "~as suspended came in -contact with a
7,200 volt line, and where the employee received a traunlatic injury and 'vas paid compens·ation· under the Oreg-on ,,...orlonen's Compensation Act, and where the Oregon
aot provided that ,,~ orkmen's Compensation was the ex..:
elusive ren1edy against one in the same employment, the
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0Tegon Sup·reme Court reversed a verdict in favor of
the employee and against the owners of the crane, saying
that 'vhere the ·crane operator ·and the employee injured
were both subject to joint control from the bridge contractor, they were in the same employment, and the injured employee could not umintain an action against the
owners of the crane ·because the injured man's rights
were limited by the Workmen's Compensation Act.
In Idaho in Cloughley vs. Orange Transportation
Company (1958) 80 Ida. 226, 327 P. 2d 369, where an
employee and a com·p·ensation carrier brought a similar
subrogation action as the one in the principal case, where
the plaintiff was an employee of Detweiler, Inc., and
where D·etweiler consigned a shipment of boilers to a
job site via Orange Tran,sportation Company, and where
Detweiler's superintendent told the driver of Orange
Transportation ·Company where to place a tractor and
traile-r while the boHers were being unloaded from the
trailer, and where Detweiler's superintendent directed
the plaintiff as to his tasks in unloading the boilers which
were to be lifted off 'vith a hook and a crane, and where
it was arranged between the superintendent for Detweiler and the driver of Orange Transportation Company that the driver would drive the truck from under
the boiler, and "~here the superintendent advised the
driver that he would station hin1self to the rear of the
truck, and by means of signals 'vhieh he gave to the
driver, Park, Park 'vas to observe the signals and move
the truck forward as directed and stop it in accordance
with the superintendent's signals, and where the boiler
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bccatne wedged to the truck and thP boo1n broke on the
ernne and the plaint iff \Vas injured and paid conlpensauon hy J)('t\vPiler's con1pensation carrier, the Idaho court
rPVPrsed a jndgtuent for the plaintiff against Orange
Tran~portation Company, saying:
"It i ~ elear frotu th~ evidence that it "~as the
duty of Det\veiler~ Inc., the consignee, to unload
the boilPrs, and that Det,vPiler, Inc. recognized
the duty, and actually took charge of it and perfortned the unloading operation. Frotn this it follo\vs that Park, in opPrating the truck during the
attetnpted unloading, "~as a co-employee or fellow
servant of plaintiff. Keither Park nor his general
etnployPr, Orange Transportation, were third partiPs against ""hom plaintiff could maintain a tort
action for datnages under Section 72-204, Idaho
Code."
The Idaho Code like the l~tah c·ode, Section 35-1-62,
provides for subrogation 'vhen the injury shall have
been caused by the 'vrongful act or neglect of another
not in the same employment as the injured employee.
In :Jiassachusetts in 111 cPadden vs. W. J. Halloran
Contpany (195S) 338 ~lass. 189, 15-± N.E. 2d 582, "~here
an action \vas brought in the right of an en1ployee of
Stafford Iron '': orks for the benefit of the plaintiff and
Stafford's compensation carrier against a contractor of
Stafford Iron Works ""hich it could have been found
negligently injured the plaintiff, and ""here it was shown
~tafford Iron ,,. . orks sold and agreed to install the steel
Inembers or beruns in a restaurant building, and ,,~here
Stafford Iron ,.V orks hired Halloran's mobile crane and
t\vo men to move the fabricated steel members from
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Stafford's truck, where Stafford did not O\\Tn a crane
and had no personnel qualified to operate a crane, when·
Stafford paid an hourly rate for the crane and ''There
the operator and oiler received their co1npensation fron1
the crane company, and \vhere Stafford's foreman supervised the position of the crane, and \Yhere ·Stafford's
employees signalled the movements of the crane, and
where Stafford first unloaded steel members to free the
truck and thereafter, where Stafford's e1nployees \rere
engaged to disengage the hooks once the steel was in
place, and where the plaintiff contended the relationship
\Vas for the jury, the ~Iassachusetts court held in favor
of the ·defendant crane company as a matter of law saying the employer and the crane o\\~ner \Yere engaged in
con1mon employment and that the e1nployee "Tho \Vas
injured when the boom collapsed had no option to sue
the crane owner at common la\v.
The very nature of ready-mix concrete makes it obvious that l\Ir. Petersen and 1\lr. Haslam were acting
under the direction and supervision of the church and
that they \Vere not free of the church's control in unloading the concrete at a ti1ne and place of their own choosing. The testimony of Frank Cottrell and the appellant
in his brief adinits that Frank Cottrell, the foreman for
the church, \Yas the man in charge of the operation.
Although it appears the trial court could have decided as a matter of law the plaintiff and Hyru1n Petersen were in the same ~1nployment, if it did not do that,
it should have submitted the question to the jury under
proper instructions, and it \Veil may be that the trial
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granted the ne\v trial hPeause it erred in not directing a verdict for the defendants or in submitting this
i~suP to the jury as requested (R. 90, 91, 92).
lt is submitted that if the Supren1e Court concludes
it has jurisdiction and does not affirm the new trial, then
it should in~truct the trial court to enter a judg1nent in
favor of tlH' defendant, dba Acme Crane Rental Colnpany, UNo Cause of Action'' as Workmen's Con1pensation
\rns the plaintiff's exclusive remedy.

('o\lrt

POINT VI.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FORlVIULATING
THE SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES.

The first question submitted to the jury in the special interrogatories (R. 142) 'vas:
1. ,\. . as the defendant, Hyrurn Petersen, negligent in

the placing or operation of the crane immediately before
or at the actual tirne of the accident in this case~
Answer:

Yes

Signed: Lel\ioyne L. Hatch
Foreman
The second question asked was :
~. Did the negligence of Hyrum Petersen proximately cause, or participate in causing the accident and injury
of w·hich plaintiff complaints?
Ans,ver : Yes
Signed:

Le~Ioyne

L. Hatch

Foreman
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We clai1n it 'vas error on the part of the court to
word its questions to the jury in disjunctivt> form.
On the subject of special interrogatories, it is statPd
in 53 A~f. J ur. - Trial 1070:
1070 Generally - '•Special interrogatories should
be so clear and concise as to be readily understood
by the jury, and 'vhen practicable each question
should be so framed as to call for a simple and
categorical ans,ver. Only such questions as can
be fairly and definitely answered should be submitted; interrogatories requiring n1ere speculation or opinion by the jury as to what might or
might not have been a certain contingency are
not proper. As a general rule, questions should
not be framed in the alternative or disjunctive,
since the answer to a question of such nature
might not necessarily express the unanimous verdict of the jurors." (Emphasis added)
Four of the jurors may have thought ~Ir. Petersen
was negligent in the operation of the crane before the
accident, and four 1nay have thought he was negligent
at the time of the accident, or all of them may have
thought that he was negligent in placing the crane before
the accident and not negligent in the operation or the
use of the crane at the time of the accident. On the question of causation, the second interrogatory or question
was also in the disjunctive and does not ans,ver 'vhether
or not the negligence of I-Iyru1n Petersen proximately
caused the accident. In ans\\Tering this question, the jurors may have n1erely assu1ned his negligence participated
in causing the accident, and the ans,ver to this interrogatory which was worded in the disjunctive failed to state
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tht· llP~lip;Pnee of l-lyru1n Petersen \Vas the proxin1ate
t'aH~e.

ln Jlurtiu rs. Ebert (194~) 2-!5 'Vis. 341, 13 N.\\'". 2d
~107 \rhrre the verdict in an action for assault rendered

in r('~pon~P to a question subtnitted by the court as to

wht.•ther Pach defendant did participate in, induce, or
~i Vl' substantial assistanet~ to, or encouragement to others
in, an assault and battery on plaintiff \vas held invalid,
~itH'P the question being in the di~junctive, it was impo~~ible to detertnine \Vhether all the jury agreed as to
the Pletnent~ subtnitted or \\·hether some of the1n agreed
on onP Ph~tuent and others on another element.

In Boyer

'C~.

Gulf, Colorado & Sante Fe Railroad
CoiHJ)(tny (1957) Tex. Civ. App. 306 S.W. 2d 215 \vhere

the jury failed to ans\\·er a special interrogatory as to
\\·hether train crew's failure to discover plight of the
injured person ,,·as a proxi1nate cause of death of in~
jured person, the court held failure to answer the interrogatory \vas not remedied by making an a'vard of
d~unages.

The jurors 1uay have thought Hyrum Petersen was
negligent only before the accident, and they may have
thought that his negligence participated in causing the
accident, but that it \\Tas not the proximate cause. The
ruuended pretrial order (R. 35) sho"\\'"S the plaintiff
claimed Hyrmn Petersen 'vas negligent in the manner
in \vhich he operated the crane, and placing or operating
the crane before the accident, even if negligently done,
\Vould not support a verdict any n1ore than negligently
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driving my car last ''"eek would support a verdict in an
accident at an intersection today.
With regard to other errors in the special verdict, I
will not comment for sake of brevity. It is, however, submitted the trial court correctly concluded that it erred
in the wording of the special interrogatories, and that it
properly granted a new trial because the questions asked
were not clear and concise.
POINT VII.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED PREJUDICALLY IN
SUBMITTING WANTON OR WILLFUL MISCONDUCT TO THE JURY.

The evidence in this case fails to show that 1\Ir. Petersen saw the plaintiff "\Vas going to take hold of the
gabro bucket under the po,verline or that he observed
that ~Ir. Haslam had parked his truck under the powerline. It also appears that since the powerline and the
power pole "\Vas something plain to be seen that he
would not realize that ~Ir. Haslarn \\"Ould not recognize
the danger. lVIr. Petersen did not observe Mr. Walker
and ~:fr. Haslam switch trucks and did not know that
~Ir. Haslarn had spotted his truck where it was at the
time he claims to have been injured.
If J\Ir. Petersen's conduct 'vas reckless or wanton
Inisconduct, then it is difficult to see "\vhy 1nerely driving an automobile is not ahvays reckless or wanton misconduct. We have no lltah cases under this type of factual situation supporting reckless or wanton misconduct.
In an automobile case in lJ!lilligan vs. Harward (1960) 11
Utah :2d 74, 355 P. 2d G:2, \\·here the driver, Harward, 'vas
40
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

eharged \vith "·illful tni:.-;eonduct in tno1nentarily taking
hi~ PVes off thP road to reach for a cigarette, our court
"
snid:
lfar\vard's act in reaching for the cigarette
rannot be construed as \\"illful misconduct. Willful
mi~conduct is the intentional doing of an act or
intentional omitting or failing to do an act, ",;ith
knowledge that serious injury is a probable and
not tnerely a possible result, or the intentional
doing of an act with wanton and reckless disregard of the possible consequences. Willful misconduct cannot be predicated upon mere inadvertence or even gross negligence."
H

~[r.

Petersen took his eyes off Mr. "\\.,..alker's truck
\rhen he swung the last load of concrete from it around
in place and did not observe the s"Titch in trucks. If it's
not \villful misconduct to take your eyes off the road
to reach for a cigarette, it would seem likewise that it· is
not wanton or willful misconduct to take your eyes of a
truck when you are engaged in doing another task. In
Ricciuti vs. Robbinson (1954) 2 Utah 2d 45, 269 P. 2d 282
\vhere an action was instituted against the automobile
driver by a passenger upon the theory the act :of the
driver in driving 60 m.p.h. in a 30 m.p.-h. speed zone
sho,v·ed willful misconduct, and where the jury returned
a verdict for the plaintiff, and where thereafter there
\\·as an appeal, our court defined willful misconduct as
follows:
"\V.illful misconduct under our guest statute
is the intentional doing of an act or intentional
omitting or. failing to do an act, with knowledge
that serious injury is a probable and not merely

41
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

a possible result, or the intentional doing of an
act with wanton and reckless disregard of the
possible consequences."
In Ricciuti vs. Robbinson, supra., the court then said
even if you assumed the defendant "ras traveling 60
m.p.h. in a residential zone, that would not indicate the
defendant had knowledge or any reason to believe that
speed probably or even possibly would result in a lighted
cigarette accidentally falling out of his mouth and an
accident occurring. Such an event just as well could have
occurred \Vhile driving 25 m.p.h. in any kind of weather
and in any speed zone. It was not the speed, but the dropping of a lighted cigarette that resulted in the loss of
control, and this accidental and involuntary circumstance
cannot be said to be willful misconduct under any reasonable theory or basis of fact.
In this case it was Mr. Petersen's failure to see that
the trucks had been switched and that ~1:r. Haslam had
not spotted his truck as far southward as ~fr. Walker
stopped his. This was an accidental and involuntary circumstance and does not show \villful misconduct or recklessness under any reasonable theory.
The instruction on recklessness and \villful misconduct was highly prejudicial, as it gave counsel for the
plaintiff a chance to inflame the jury and argue that
among all else we were liable because \Ve placed the
crane \vhere boon1 of it could con1e in contact with the
po\\rerlines, and thus \\'"e \vere liable because \Ve did not
have the foresight to foresee that ~[r. Haslam would
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~top hi~

truek "·hen· hP did. ~~ r. l-iaslan1 \Vas not an invitPP of A<'lllP CranP Rental Cotnpany.
POINT VIII.
ON THE QUESTION OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE, THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THE VERDICT WAS AGAINST THE
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.

The evidence sho,vs that l\lr. Haslarn had been driving a ready-1nix ceinPnt truck some seven years prior to
the ti1ne of the accident, and that he \Yas an experienced
truck drivPr. II P arrived at the job site about 12 :30 P.M.
on a cloudy, cold day and had sorne ten or fifteen nlinut P~ in ''" hich to \Vai t and observe all of the hazards and
problen1~ incident to unloading his truck. However, by
hi~ o\vn h_·~thnony, he admits that he failed to see the
po\rPrline and po\ver pole and the hazards involved
w·hi('h \Vere ite1ns \Vhich he adn1its were plain to be seen,
and that he did not back his truck into a safe area and
spot it in a spot as did ~Ir. v\~ alker for unloading.
In sumn1ary the great "·(Jight of the evidence shows
that he "·as negligent in not keeping a proper lookout
for his O\\"n safety at the job site.
POINT IX.
TRIAL COURTS HAVE A WIDE LATITUDE IN
GRANTING NEW TRIALS.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a ne\\" trial, and in fact, acted properly. In Beck vs.
Dzdchman Coalition J.llines Co. (1954) 2 Utah 2d 104, 269
I>. 2d 867, this court said:
"Trial courts have \vide latitude in granting
or denying motions for ne\v trials. Considering
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the evidence "Thich respondent adduced, which
evidence the jury "\\7 as entitled to believe, we cannot say as a matter of law that the court below
abused its discretion in denying the Inotion****."
Likewise, in Bowden vs. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Company (1955) 3 Utah 2d -!44, 286 P. 2d
240 the court said a trial court has a wide discretion in
granting or denying motions for a new trial, and that
the reviewing court will interfere with the exercise thereof only if there is a clear abuse of discretion.
In Holmes vs. Nelson (1958) 7 Utah -!35, 326 P. 2d
722, where the trial judge concluded the evidence 'ras
insufficient to justify the verdict, this court affirmed
the granting of a new trial.
In the case in question, although the jurors received
a mandatory instruction to a'vard the Third Party Plaintiffs a judgment in like amount against the Third Party
D,efendant as they a'varded the Plaintiff, they arbitrarily
disregarded this instruction, although they answered a
complicated set of special interrogatories prior to refusing to follow this instruction, and thereafter, they gave
Third p·arty Plaintiff the first time they 'Yere sent out
$100.00 general daamges, and $58.00 in special damages,
and not until they were sent out the second time did they
follow the court's instructions.
Further, the medical testimony sho,Ys that the medical treatment the plaintiff required follo,ving the accident was of a minor nature, yet the jurors awarded
general damages of $50,000.00. Moreover, there was a
considerable a.rnount of evidence to support a finding of
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t•ontributory negligencP. On the question of contributory
rH'gligence, it would seem that in all probability the great
wl'i~ht of the evidence sho\ved plaintiff was contributorily negligent. The eourt, kno\\~ing the jury disregarded
tht· instruction on damages and then used the same scale
of justi('P to \Yeight the evidence on contributory negli~PIH'P, had reason to believe the jurors did not fairly
wl'ight the facts in considering the question of contribu-:
tory negligence.
In the trial of this case there were several errors,.
all of "·hieh had an adverse and prejudicial cumulative
effeet. In !vic rs. Richa.rdson (1959) 9 Utah 2d 5, 33-6
P. :!d 781, this court ordered a new trial saying:
''It is unnecessary and would serve no useful
purpose for us to decide whether any one of the
errors above discussed, considered separately,
\Vould constitute sufficient prejudicial error to
require a_ new trial. 'The questio:p. is, whether the
case was presented to the jury in such a manner
that it is reasonable to believe there was a fair
and iinpartial analysis of the evidence and a just
verdict. If errors \vere committed which prevented this from being done; then a new trial
should be granted, whether it resulted from one
error, or from several errors cumulatively. We
expressly do not mean to say that trivia which
'vould be innocuous in themselves can be ·added
together to make sufficient error to result in
prejudice and reversal. The errors must be real
and substantial and such as may reasonably be·
supposed \Vould affect the result. However, errors.
of the latter character, which may not by themselves justify a rev_ersal, may well? when consid45
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ered together with others, render it clear that a
fair trial was not had. In such event justice can
only be served by the granting of a new trial,
absent the errors complained of. It is so ordered.
Costs to appellants."
IC'ONCLUSION
The trial court correctly concluded that justice would
be served only if a new trial were granted because:
1. Excessive damages appeared to it to have been
awarded under the influence of passion and prejudice.
2. The evidence was insufficient to justify the verdict, and the verdict was against the law.
3. It erred in instructing the jury and formulating
the questions submitted as special interrogatories.
Respectfully submitted,
RAYMOND M. BERRY
203 Executive Building
455 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Defendants-Respondents
Paulsen, dba Acme Crane
Rental Company
I hereby certify that on this __________ day of November,
1963, I mailed two copies of this Brief by United States
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